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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The legitimate conclusions to be drawn from Genaust are speculative
in nature. However, one conclusion is that the Illinois Supreme Court
is continuing to take a restrictive attitude toward product liability
claims. This trend began in Winnett v. Winnett," in which the court
held that a bystander was not an intended user and not foreseeable as
a matter of law. Thus, in Genaust as in Winnett, the scope of duty has
been restricted by use of a foreseeability test. This desire to limit the
number of strict liability actions was also indicated in Rios v. Niagara
Machine and Tool Works." The court in Rios held that once a purchaser
of a product installs a safety device thereon, any unreasonably danger-
ous condition that existed due to the lack of such device was no longer
present. Thus, the manufacturer was not liable for failure to install a
safety device.
The future role of foreseeability in duty to warn cases is a major
concern. It is likely that foreseeability will become the only factor which
will determine whether there is a duty to warn. Courts will not consider
the seriousness of the injury or the burden of precaution. 7 The decision
may impede the development and expansion of the manufacturer's duty
to warn. Closer scrutiny must be given to the duty of the manufacturer
in future cases as modern and rapid advances in technology result in the
production of highly sophisticated products. Many consumers will lack
the experience, skill and knowledge necessary to fully comprehend the
dangerous propensities of the products and must be made aware of the
possible dangers resulting from their use. In this respect, the courts
should be the vanguard of the public to minimize the adverse effects of
a narrowed scope of the duty to warn."
Jeffrey Kripton
Discovery-Testing-PARTIALLY DESTRUCTIVE TESTING is WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE ILLINOIS DISCOVERY RuLES-Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hard-
ware, Inc., 63 Ill.2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
In Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc.,' the Illinois Supreme Court
45. 57 Ill.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (injury to child resulting when her hands were placed
in a conveyor belt, held not foreseeable on a motion to dismiss).
46. 12 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974).
47. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
48. For an overview concerning other types of defects in strict liability, see Hofeld,
Looking At a Decade of Product Liability Law in Illinois- Where We've Been and Where
We're Going, 64 ILL. B.J. 344 (1976); Pope & Pope, Design Defects Cases: The Present
State of Illinois Product Liability Law, 8 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 351 (1975).
1. 63 Ill.2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
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addressed the issue of whether Illinois discovery rules permit partially
destructive testing of evidence. Adopting the rationale of prior case law,'
the court looked to the objectives to be achieved by the discovery rules.
The Sarver court held that partially destructive testing of evidence be-
fore trial, when authorized under the sound discretion of the trial court,'
is permissible under the discovery provisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court.4 This note will examine the Sarver holding in light of the pur-
poses of the discovery rules and will comment upon a possible applica-
tion of the Sarver principles to totally destructive testing.
The plaintiff in Sarver was injured by an allegedly defective hammer
manufactured by the defendant, Estwing Manufacturing Company, and
sold by the defendant Barrett Ace Hardware. The plaintiff alleged that
while using the hammer a piece of metal chipped off its striking face and
struck him in the eye, causing serious injury. At trial, the metal chip
that caused the injury was unavailable for inspection. ' In order to
ascertain whether the hammer was defective,' tests that would destroy
a portion of the hammer had to be performed.7 Subject to limitations,'
the trial court granted the defendant's request for destructive testing.'
The appellate court reversed,"0 noting that the relevant Illinois discovery
provisions, Supreme Court Rules 201(b)(1)" and 214,12 do not expressly
2. People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967); Monier v.
Chamberlain, 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
3. See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
4. 63 Ill.2d at 454, 349 N.E.2d at 30.
5. Id. at 457, 349 N.E.2d at 29. Realizing that the metal chip that allegedly caused the
injury was unavailable for inspection, the defendant Estwing made a request for produc-
tion of the hammer. This request was granted for the purpose of enabling the defendant
to visually examine the object. Id.
6. In order to show the liability of a seller in a products liability action, it is essential
to illustrate that the product was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
7. A visual examination of the striking face of the hammer revealed some indentations
but no obvious chipping. An expert for the defendant found that in order to determine
the metallurgical properties of the hammer, it would be necessary to remove a piece of
metal from it for testing purposes. 63 Ill.2d at 457, 349 N.E.2d at 29.
8. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
9. 63 Ill.2d at 457-58, 349 N.E.2d at 29. Counsel for the plaintiff had refused to comply
with the discovery order, ostensibly upon grounds that the legal theory of discovery
under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 and 214 does not provide for destructive testing.
63 Ill.2d at 458-59, 349 N.E.2d at 29.
10. 29 Ill.App.3d 195, 199, 330 N.E.2d 269, 272 (1975).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b)(1) (1975). The relevant portion of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 201(b)(1) states:
Except as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery full disclo-
sure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking disclosure
or of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
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sanction destructive testing." Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court was
faced with the issue whether the language of Supreme Court Rules
201(b)(1) and 214 is broad enough to include the physical testing of
tangible objects, even when that testing involves the alteration or par-
tial destruction of the object. " The court held that partially destructive
testing is allowable because it relates to the "nature" and "condition"
of tangible things under Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1) and falls within
the term "inspection" under Supreme Court Rule 214.' 5
In Sarver, the court noted that few jurisdictions have dealt with the
question whether destructive testing is a permissible discovery device."
condition, and location of any documents or tangible things, and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts ...
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §214 (1975). The relevant portion of Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 214 states:
Any party may by written request direct any other party to produce for inspec-
tion, copying, reproduction, and photographing specified documents, objects or
tangible things, or to permit access to real estate for the purpose of making
surface or sub-surface inspections or surveys or photographs, or to disclose infor-
mation calculated to lead to the discovery of the whereabouts of any of these
items, whenever the nature, contents, or condition of such documents, objects,
tangible things, or real estate is relevant to the subject matter of the ac-
tion . ..
13. 29 Ill.App.3d 195, 198-99, 330 N.E.2d 269, 272 (3d Dist. 1975). The appellate court
reasoned that any expansion of the interpretation of the rules to allow destructive testing
would involve a policy question which should be determined by the supreme court, partic-
ularly since an amendment of the rules or a previously unaccepted interpretation might
be required.
14. 63 Ill.2d at 459, 349 N.E.2d at 29.
15. Id. at 460, 349 N.E.2d at 30.
16. New York is one of the few jurisdictions that permits destructive testing. The New
York Civil Practice Law & Rules specifically provides for testing:
Discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, testing, copy-
ing or photographing
(a) As against party:
1) After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party
notice:
(i) to produce and permit the party seeking discovery, or someone acting on his
behalf, to inspect, copy, test or photograph any specifically designated docu-
ments or any things ...
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW (Consol.) §3120. The New York rule is in contrast to the Illinois
rule which does not provide for testing. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
The New York courts have allowed partially destructive testing under the New York
civil practice rule. In Foster-Lipkins Corp. v. Suburban Propane Gas Co., 72 Misc.2d 457,
339 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1973), the court allowed testing procedures that would have resulted
in the virtual destruction of certain parts of a cylinder. The principles that provided the
basis for the New York court's decision were in harmony with the basic goals of the Sarver
court-to facilitate and expedite the trial in accordance with the rights of the parties and
to illuminate the issues in the case. Compare Foster-Lipkins Corp. v. Suburban Propane-
Gas Co., 72 Misc.2d 457, 339 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1973), with Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware,
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The court examined previous Illinois cases to determine the objectives
behind this state's discovery provisions. In People ex rel. General Motors
v. Bua,'7 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a discovery request
for the production of voluminous documents.'8 Criticizing the unreason-
able discovery request, the court expressed the hope "that the bench
and bar will wisely use the tools of discovery to illuminate the actual
issues in the case rather than to harass and obstruct the opposing liti-
gants."'" In addition to the Bua decision, the Sarver court relied upon
Monier v. Chamberlain.0 In Monier, the court stated that "the objective
to be obtained under the discovery rules is the expeditious and final
determination of controversies in accordance with the substantive
rights of the parties."'
The proposition that the discovery rules are to be used to illuminate
the actual issues in the case and to expedite the trial in accordance with
Inc., 63 I1.2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
Partially destructive testing has been approved by the New York courts in other factual
situations. In Edwardes v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc.2d 187, 278 N.Y.S.2d 283
(1967), suit was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained when an intramedullary
pin broke while in place. The defendant requested production of the pin for testing. The
court noted that an adequate test could be performed on '/4 inch of the 131/2 inch pin
and held that since the pin was central to the case, testing could be done. See also Beauty
Silk Mfg. Co. v. Krumholz, 141 Misc. 204, 252 N.Y.S. 643 (1931). Contra, Jerry & Herbert
Lehmann, Inc. v. Turtle Bros., 149 Misc. 744, 267 N.Y.S. 785 (1933).
17. 37 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
18. The plaintiff, injured while riding in a 1961 Corvair, contended that General Motors
negligently manufactured a tie rod that caused the accident. At trial, a request was made
and granted for the production of documents relating to the Corvair model years from 1960
through 1965. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that to demand complete
records for Corvair model years through 1965 was an abuse of the discovery rule. Id. at
193-94, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
19. Id. at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
20. 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966). In Monier, the court interpreted former Su-
preme Court Rule 17, predecessor of Supreme Court Rule 214, relating to the inspection
of tangible things. Former Supreme Court Rule 17 provided:
A party may at any time move for an order directing any other party or person
to produce specified documents, relating to the merits of the matter in litigaticn,
for inspection and to be copied or reproduced, or produce for inspection or to
be photographed objects or tangible things relative to the merits of the said
matter. ...
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §101.17 (current version at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §214 (1975)).
The action in Monier was brought to recover damages for personal injuries arising from
an accident allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
The plaintiff requested that the defendant and his insurance company produce for inspec-
tion and copying numerous documents, reports, and memoranda made by the defendant
concerning the accident. The court held that the discovery request sufficiently designated
the materials sought and allowed discovery of the items. 35 I1.2d 351, 356, 221 N.E.2d
410, 414-15 (1966).
21. Id. at 357, 221 N.E.2d at 415.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the substantive rights of the parties is supported by the broad policy
objectives behind promulgation of discovery rules. With the adoption of
the discovery provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," a
liberal philosophy of pre-trial discovery was established." This philoso-
phy also had a substantial effect upon the promulgation of pre-trial
discovery rules in the individual states.2 The basic objective of this
philosophy was the elimination of trickery in order to safeguard against
surprise at trial.2" In most instances, pre-trial discovery improves the
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
23. Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
MICH. L. REV. 205 (1942). See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 120-22 (1972); Speck, The
Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132 (1951). At common
law it was virtually impossible for a party to investigate an opponent's claim or his
awareness of relevant information before trial. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §6.1 at 179-80
(1965). Common law equity courts did have a pre-trial device that was a forerunner of
modern day discovery. This device was known as a bill of discovery in aid of an action at
law or defense at law. The bill of discovery afforded a party the opportunity to have his
adversary answer interrogatories that would be received as admissions at trial. However,
equity still adhered to the concept that the trial was the appropriate time for determining
the facts of a case. Id. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1846 at 379-80 (3d ed. 1940). See
generally James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929). The common law relied almost
exclusively upon the pleadings to give advance notice to the parties of claims and defenses.
See G. RAOLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-5 (1932). For a short history of the develop-
ment of discovery from the common law to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
201-19 (1952).
24. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 122 (1972). For a comparison of various states
that have made significant modifications by incorporating versions of the Federal Discov-
ery Rules into their practices, see Note, Discovery Practice in States Adopting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 HAsv. L. REV. 673 (1955).
25. See Parrino v. Landon, 8 Ill.2d 468, 472, 134 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1956); W. GLASER,
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 11 (1968). This is accomplished by edu-
cating the parties prior to trial of true claims and defenses. Drehle v. Fleming, 129 Il.
App.2d 166, 263 N.E.2d 348 (3d Dist. 1970), aff'd, 49 Ill.2d 293, 274 N.E.2d 53 (1971). See
People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 236, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957). In Terry,
pursuant to former Supreme Court Rule 101.19-4, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-4 (1957),
the Illinois Supreme Court ordered an insured defendant to answer written interrogatories
as to the existence and amount of liability insurance. The plaintiff had sued the defendant
for personal injuries resulting from the defendant's alleged negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. The above cited Supreme Court Rule provided that "a deposition may be taken
as to any matter not privileged which relates to the merits of the matter in litigation."
This provision was construed by the court as encompassing the disclosure of the existence
and amount of the defendant's liability insurance. The rationale of the decision turned
upon the fact that where an automobile liability insurance policy is in effect, an injured
party may sue the insurer if a judgment is returned unsatisfied against the insured.
Therefore, the disclosure of the insurance policy educated the plaintiff as to possible
action against the insurer. In turn, educating the parties promoted the chances of settle-
ments. See W. GIASER, PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 83 (1968); G.
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 252 (1932).
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quality of the trial because the issues are better defined, less irrelevant
evidence is introduced, and fewer fabrications are possible at trial."
The Sarver holding clearly is within the scope of this liberal
philosophy. Sarver involved a products liability claim. In a products
liability action, the most important issue is whether a defect actually
exists.Y The trial court in Sarver found that defectiveness could not be
determined by a visual examination of the hammer .2 Therefore, it was
necessary to allow testing, even though that testing was destructive. The
court noted that the testing, by illuminating the essential issue of defec-
tiveness, would facilitate the final determination of the controversy.2
Sarver established that partially destructive testing is within the
scope of the Illinois discovery rules. However, the decision indicated
that courts should be wary of placing unreasonable burdens upon liti-
gants who are ordered to comply with requests for such testing. To
protect those litigants, the court demanded that three conditions be
satisfied before destructive testing could be allowed; first, the testing
must be relevant to the issues presented in the case; second, the infor-
mation sought must be unavailable through any less destructive
methods; and finally, the destructive testing must not unreasonably
impair the presentation of the opposing litigant's case.', The court
found that these requirements had been satisfied fully by virtue of the
26. W. GLASER, PRE-TRIAL DiscovERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 11 (1968). Accord, G.
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 252 (1932):
Where full and equal discovery is allowed lawyers say that they come much
nearer to obtaining the truth because:
(1) The witness is examined while his memory is fresh; (2) The witness
usually is not coached in preparation for the trial, and consequently
his testimony is more spontaneous; (3) A party who has been pinned
down to a definite and detailed story early in the litigation can ill
afford to manufacture testimony contrary to this story for he is already
bound.
See also Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
22, 27 (1968).
27. See note 6 supra.
28. 63 Ill.2d at 457, 349 N.E.2d at 29.
29. Id. at 460, 349 N.E.2d at 30.
30. The Sarver court stated that:
Our holding necessarily vests broad discretionary powers in the trial court, and
"such a breadth of power requires a careful exercise of discretion in order to
balance the needs of truth and excessive burden to the litigants."
Id. at 460-61, 349 N.E.2d at 30, quoting People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d
180, 193, 226 N.E.2d 6, 14 (1967). The burdens in Bua were overbroad and imprecise
discovery demands for large numbers of documents, records, and drawings. The court held
that the discovery orders which had been issued requiring production of the various re-
cords were too broad and could not be enforced.
31. 63 Ill.2d at 461, 349 N.E.2d at 30.
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safeguards ordered by the trial court.3" The trial court had imposed the
following conditions: first, a detailed testing plan was to be submitted
for the court's approval; second, adequate notice of the time of testing
was to be given to opposing counsel; third, opposing counsel could ob-
serve and photograph the testing procedure; and finally, one-half of the
samples taken at the testing had to be given to the party opposing the
discovery request.3
Application of these principles may present a problem when a party
to a lawsuit, seeking a determination of essential facts, requests testing
that would result in the total destruction of the tested item. The conflict
in such a case probably would center around satisfying the condition
that the destructive testing not unreasonably impair presentation of the
opposing litigant's case. However, in many cases this difficulty could be
resolved by applying safeguards similar to the ones approved in Sarver.
The opposing party could be given adequate notice and a chance to
observe and record the tests regardless of whether the result would be
total or partial destruction." Of course, if the tested item were destroyed
totally, it would be impossible to comply with the final Sarver safe-
guard requiring retention and delivery of samples. However, the court
in Sarver recognized that this particular order was applicable only to a
situation in which partially destructive testing was sought., Further,
the court stated that "[t]he nature of the protective order required will,
of course, depend upon the facts in each case."" The Illinois Supreme
Court therefore has indicated that in a case where totally destructive
testing is requested, the courts may fashion appropriate safeguards to
protect the rights of the litigants.
These safeguards, however, may be inadequate if the opposing party
requests that the item be retained intact in order that it may be admit-
ted into evidence. A party seeking to introduce the item at trial could
argue that allowing its destruction would "unreasonably impair the...
presentation of his case to the trier of fact."37 Admitting an object at
32. Id. at 461-62, 349 N.E.2d at 31.
33. Id.
34. For example, the Sarver trial court required that a detailed testing plan be submit-
ted for the court's approval, adequate notice of the time of testing be given to opposing
counsel, and that opposing counsel be allowed to observe and photograph the testing
procedure. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. These requirements, and any similar
requirements that provide adequate notice and opportunity to observe, could apparently
be met in any testing situation, regardless of the extent of the resulting destruction.
35. The Sarver court stated that turning over one-half of the samples taken at the
testing was required "so that additional destruction of the hammer will not be necessary."
63 Ill.2d at 461, 349 N.E.2d at 31.
36. Id. at 461-62, 349 N.E.2d at 31.
37. Id. at 461, 349 N.E.2d at 30. See also text accompanying note 31 supra.
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trial, as either real or demonstrative evidence,38 is within the discretion
of the trial court.39 The criteria used in determining whether the evi-
dence will be exhibited at trial is its relevance and value to the
factfinder's understanding of the issues presented by the case.4" Appar-
ently seeking the same goal, Sarver allowed destructive testing to pro-
mote greater understanding of the essential issue of the product's defec-
tiveness."
It would seem that testing an item and exhibiting an item at trial
serve the same purpose. However, real or demonstrative evidence will
not be admitted at trial if its admission would serve no useful purpose,
or if better evidence is available.43 Therefore, when destructive testing
would better illuminate the relevant facts in the case, permission for
such testing should not be withheld because destruction of the item
would prevent its exhibition at trial. This general rule would achieve the
result desired by all the parties-the sure and expedient clarification of
the relevant issues in the case.
38. The evidence may be real evidence, which involves the production of an object
which had a direct part in the incident, or demonstrative evidence, which has no proba-
tive value in itself, but which serves as an aid to the finder of fact in comprehending verbal
testimony. See Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill.App.2d 67, 75-76, 134 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1956).
In either case, the real or demonstrative evidence is addressed directly to the senses of
the court or jury for their observation, without intervention of witness testimony. See
Kabase v. State, 31 Ala.App. 77, 12 So.2d 758 (1943); Holloway v. Evans, 55 N.M. 601,
238 P.2d 457 (1951). For examples of various situations in which this type of evidence has
been admitted at trial, see E. E. Thomas Fruit Co. v. Start, 107 Cal. 206, 40 P. 336 (1895)
(holding that the admission of four boxes of fruit into evidence at trial was proper as a
means of showing the condition of a larger quantity of the fruit); Iske v. Metropolitan
Util. Dist. of Omaha, 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968) (holding that a design for the
development of recreational lots on an island was admissible into evidence at trial in order
to illuminate the issue of the island's prospective use); Advance Loan Serv. v. Mandik,
306 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Ct.App. 1957) (holding that empty medicine bottles and containers
were admissible into evidence at trial in corroboration of testimony that certain medicines
had been purchased and used). See also State v. Marcus, 240 Iowa 116, 34 N.W.2d 179
(1948).
39. See Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash.2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966);
Bittner v. Wheel Horse Products, Inc., 28 Ill. App.3d 44, 328 N.E.2d 160 (1st Dist. 1975);
Riddle v. Memorial Hosp., 43 App.Div.2d 750, 349 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1973).
40. Riddle v. Memorial Hosp., 43 App.Div.2d 750, 349 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1973). See also
Kunzman v. Cherokee Silo Co., 253 Iowa 885, 114 N.W.2d 534 (1962); Sherman v. City of
Springfield, 77 Ill.App.2d 195, 222 N.E.2d 62 (4th Dist. 1966).
41. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
42. See, e.g., Bitton v. International Transp., Inc., 437 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding
that it was proper to deny a request to disassemble a mechanism and submit a portion of
it into evidence at trial, since the jury had sufficient opportunity to view the item, and
photographs and a duplicate of the item were received into evidence); Bates v. Newman,
121 Cal.App. 800, 264 P.2d 197 (2d Dist. 1953) (holding that it was not error to refuse to
allow the admission of demonstrative evidence, when such evidence would merely have
been cumulative of evidence that had previously been received).
43. See Holloway v. Evans, 55 N.M. 601, 607-08, 238 P.2d 457, 461 (1951).
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The Illinois Supreme Court in Sarver set sound precedent in Illinois
by implementing the underlying purposes of the discovery rules. The
decision furthers the ability of the courts to ascertain the truth and to
dispose of lawsuits without resort to speculation and conjecture.
Joseph Taconi, Jr.
